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International Legal Solutions
to the Middle East Crisis*
I. Introduction
In view of the years of distrust and bloodshed between the Arabs and
Israelis, applying the almost utopian concept of international law to the
Middle East may seem impractical. Yet, it should be pointed out that
international law created that problem and applying the tort concept of
responsibility for the natural and foreseeable consequences of an action, it
follows that international law should find a solution to it. Also, the states in
the region adamantly stress their adherence to its principles. While this
adherence alone does not prove the value of international law, the possi-
bility of utilizing it to materially alleviate discord ought not to be over-
looked.
Applying the principles of International Law to these questions not only
helps to sharpen the issues, but also provides a source of new ideas which
might... provide a basis for accommodation.'
With hope toward a resolution of issues, an attempt will be made to search
for international legal solutions to the Middle East crisis.
II. Possible Legal Solutions
A. The International Court of Justice
The first and most obvious institution for settlement of international
disputes is the International Court of Justice. Unfortunately, the practical
ability of this august body leaves much to be desired, 2 for "It is fair to
*This paper was one of the two joint winners of the 1971 Henry C. Morris International
Law Contest. The second winning paper follows.
'Robert Neuman, The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Legal Issues and Possible Solutions, 4
INT'L LAWYER, 360, 362 (1970).20f course, this depends on one's criteria for evaluating performance. It should be noted
that "Since 1947 the Court has been seised of a total of 51 cases, in which it has been given
30 judgments and 13 advisory opinions..." [1968-69] I.C.J.Y. 99. On July 29, 1970 the
U.N. Security Council requested an advisory opinion, bringing the total to 14. The number of
public hearings dropped from 78 in 1968-69 to 2 in 1969-70, according to the Yearbooks of
those years.
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assert that the disputes which have been most dangerous to the peace and
security of the world were heard neither by the Permanent Court of
International Justice, nor the International Court of Justice." Though
conceptually profound, the Court's major function today appears to be the
relaxation of tensions by directing settlements into the political arena.
Further, new states display special reluctance to appear before this
forum. 4 While accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, both
Israel and Egypt have seriously restricted the scope of litigable issues.
Israel lists six broad reservations; 5 Egypt severely limited the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction to disputes between parties to the Constantinople
Convention of 1888.6 Under the reservations of either state, a case be-
tween the U.A.R. and Israel is impossible.
7
Israel seems to have a special reason for wariness. The U.N. Charter
provides for redress to the Security Council if a party does not comply
with a Court judgment. 8 The present political make-up of the Council gives
Israel good reason to believe that steps would be taken to implement a
judgment against her, while the likelihood of a Soviet veto gives Egypt
great leverage to disregard adverse decisions with impunity. Since Russia
uses her veto to implement foreign policy,9 and the U.S. avoids using hers,
the likelihood of a U.S. veto to assist Israel is small. 10
3Harold Owen, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: A Study of
its Acceptance by Nations, 3 GA. L. REV. 704, 710. (1969).4
"The major reason behind the lack of enthusiasm toward the Court on the part of new
states is ... the availability of alternative methods which in their view offer greater opportun-
ity for a compromise in a shorter time and with less expense and which leave them a wider
freedom of action if the final settlement is not to their liking. Ibrahim Shihata, The Attitude of
New States Toward the International Court of Justice, 19 INT'L ORGAN. 203, 217-8 (1965).
5[1956-57], I.C.J.Y.B. 214-215. See also Shihata, supra, and Owen, supra.
6Egypt allowed the Court jurisdiction only as to "[D]isputes between the parties to the
Constantinople Convention of 1888 concerning the Suez Canal as to the interpretation or
application of its provisions." [1956-57] I.C.J.Y.B. 212-213, and 241. But see Rosenne,
Directions for a Middle East Settlement-Some Underlying Legal Problems, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 44, 46 (1968). He do&s not feel that this was really an acceptance.7According to the Israeli acceptance, Articles (c) and (d) would both preclude litigation
involving Egypt, and since Israel was not a signatory of the 1888 Convention it does not meet
the Egyptian requirements. It should also be noted that tlhese are the only states in the region
that have accepted any jurisdiction at all. Supra note 4.
8U.N. CHARTER article 94(2): "If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the court, the other party may have recourse
to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide
upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." See also Rosenne, The In-
ternational Court of Justice (1957 edition), 102- 112 for an interpretation of the article.
9Prof. Reisman points out that applications for enforcement directives in the U.N. can be
blocked by the use of Article 94(2). He says ". . . It is difficult to imagine that the U.S.S.R.,
which is doctrinally antipathetic to international adjudication, is anxious to maintain or extend
the power of the Court." "... verbatim records indicate that the U.S.S.R. would have vetoed
any measures against Iran." W. M. Reisman, The Enforcement of International Judgments,
63 A.J.I.L. I, 10 note 30 (1969). But it is also true that the Security Council can use armed
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Professor Rosenne suggests that under the conditions of the Middle
East, the Court might not even render an advisory opinion."
This conclusion seems to be substantiated by the Aerial Incident of 27
July, 1955 [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 127, involving Israel and Bulgaria. In light of
the Communist view of international law, it was obvious to the court that a
decision against Bulgaria would go unheeded. Apparently taking this factor
into account, the Court disseised itself of jurisdiction. 12 Thus, where non-
compliance is probable, there is reason to believe that the Court would
follow this precedent and avoid the case.
B. The United Nations
1. Imposed Settlement
There are several ways the U.N. could help solve the Middle East
problem. For example, the Security Council could declare the area a threat
to international peace and, under the terms of the Charter, impose a
settlement.' 3 Unfortunately, it is difficult to perceive any lasting settlement
arising from this procedure. Another problem With this approach is the
realities of enforcement procedure. For the U.N. to resort to force to
implement a decision seems a bit unrealistic,' 4 but this may be their only
alternative if both parties do not accept the settlements.
2. Voluntary Settlements
(a) In General. A more practical approach would be the creation of a
special committee, similar to U.N.S.C.O.P. 15 This committee would make
recommendations about its findings on possible equitable solutions, and
force only when peace is threatened and so Israel could conceivably disregard an adverse
judgment without serious fear of forceful implementation, and suffer only adverse world
opinion. U.N. CHARTER ch. 7.
X°For 25 years the U.S. made a point of shunning the use of the veto absolutely. The first
veto was cast in March, 1970, see 74 NEWSWEEK 47 (March 30, 1970).
""Experience of the use of the advisory opinion in political circumstances seems to
indicate two things at least:
(a) That before the advisory procedure can be put to fruitful use, there has to be some
measure of general agreement that the judicial pronouncement, WHATEVER IT MIGHT BE,
would facilitate the political decisions; and
(b) that in the circumstances there is a reasonable measure of agreement between the
states concerned that procedures available under the Statute of the International Court of
Justice would be appropriate for the determination of given and agreed issues."
His conclusion is that the necessary consensual basis in fact is missing in the Middle East and
that ". . . in such circumstances, the Court would have found it improper for it to have taken
part in such an abuse of the judicial machinery." Rosenne, supra note 6 at 46, 47.
12[1959] I.C.J. REP. 127. Fora discussion, see Reisman, supra note 9 at 3, note 7.
13U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 36(1), 39, 40, 41, 42.
14 Note that the resort to force can only be attempted when peace is threatened. See U.N.
CHARTER ch. 7.
"United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947.
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report back to the General Assembly. Since a recommendation of this type
would not be binding, 16 the countries of the Middle East would receive the
benefits of a "world court of equity," without the detriments accompanying
an adverse decision. Even if the recommendation were not accepted by the
parties, it would provide a basis for concrete negotiations.
(b) Sinai. The balance of power in the Middle East suggests that Egypt
is the most important country for Israel to deal with, 17 since a settlement
between the U.A.R. and Israel would permit the remaining Arab states to
follow suit without loss of face.
Some commentators have tied their hopes on a settlement with Egypt to
the question of control of the Suez Canal. 18 While this waterway is an
important item on the agenda, the willingness of the oil-rich states to
underwrite the loss of toll revenue to Egypt indicates that she can exist
quite well without its operating. Moreover, Israel has flourished for 23
years without using the Canal and has shown that it is not essential to her
existence, either. Since Egypt has consistently refused any reopening of
the Canal that does not include Egyptian control over part of Sinai, the
conclusion reached is that the Suez Canal cannot be discussed without
taking the Sinai into consideration.
Professor Reisman's recent publication contains a credible plan for the
Sinai.19 He proposes a Sinai Development Trust to administer the area for
a lengthy period of time, with reversion of sovereignty to Egypt at its
expiration. The Trust would operate similar to a corporation and contract
out for plans leading to industrial development of the peninsula. By agree-
ing to this partial relinquishment of sovereignty, Egypt would acquire the
economic benefits of an industrially developed Sinai, the withdrawal of
Israeli troops, and the guaranteed return of her land. Israel, for her part,
would acquire a buffer zone where Egypt had such concentrated industry
that she would hesitate to commence warfare.
Due to the heavy world investments in the trust area, 20 world pressure
would help maintain peace also. Since the Sinai is huge and virtually
uninhabited, unique industrial experiments would be possible. The accom-
panying rise in the standard of living in the region would reduce Arab
16See Obed Asamoah, Legal Effects of Resolutions of the General Assembly, 3 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 210 (1965).
17See Nadav 0. Safron, The Alternatives in the Middle East, 47 COMME-NTARY 45, 50.
"'See, for example, J. G. Laylin, International Control of the Suez Canal: The Case for
International Control, 2 INT'L LAWYER 33 (1967).
19 MICHAEL REISMAN, THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE: DIPLOMATIC ALTERNATIVES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, Princeton University Press (1970).20The proposal suggests floating huge bond issues on the world market to provide
problems of voting, etc., but involving large numbers of influential people and governments.
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
Legal Solutions to Middle East Crisis
dependence on Russia, and eliminate the need for belligerency as a tool for
internal pacification. The long-term status of the trust assures Israel of 30
to 50 years of peace. By appointing the World Bank as trustee, the possi-
bility of partisan politics would be minimized and the U.N. could stand
behind the plan to ensure the fulfillment of the trust's terms.
Though Prof. Reisman's proposal is solidly based in the international
instrumentalities he suggests, it draws heavily upon the belief that econom-
ic interests will keep Arab nationalism in check. Unhappily, the factors
that make international interests crucial in some parts of the world may not
necessarily apply to the Middle East. Israel's socialistically committed
government and precarious political position could not allow economic
interests to prevent her from conducting a war she considered necessary
for survival.21 Egypt, on the other hand, has shown the world that she can
be led to a war contrary to her interests by runaway rhetoric and inept
brinksmanship. The ability and apparent desire of the wealthy oil states to
underwrite the costs of a Jihad22 also indicate the need for a settlement not
heavily dependent on economic factors.
Prof. Reisman's suggestion is helpful though and should be viewed as
one possibility for international control of the Sinai. It should be empha-
sized however, that neither the Canal nor the Sinai will finally determine
the success or failure of efforts towards peace in the Middle East. Instead,
it is the resolution of the internal problems of Egypt that will eventually
lead to lasting peace. With one Egyptian baby born every 40 seconds, 23 the
real threat to Egypt is not Israel but her own underdevelopment. Prof.
Reisman's work is most commendable because it is directed to this critical
problem.
An effective settlement should speak to the economic problem and
answer the needs of the Egyptian leadership to effectuate a return of land
as proof of Arab strength. One method would be to fuse the trust idea with
a return of land. The Sinai would be partitioned along a line drawn from El
Arish to Sharm el-Sheikh. The Egyptians would then regain sovereignty
over the eastern part under the following conditions.
First, the area would be demilitarized. U.N. guards 24-not just observ-
ers-would ensure compliance with this condition and show that the pre-
21For this plan to work, it is not necessary for Israel to purchase any bonds, but it is
likely that she would do so to show good faith. Regardless, if she felt threatened, the monetary
factor could not possibly outweigh the threat of possible politicide and genocide.22Arabic for "Holy War."23TIME, May 17, 1971, at 23.
24To dispel any fears on either side, only neutral nations should be allowed to participate,
and the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would both be excluded.
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ventive measures were not illusory. Egypt would be the sovereign, though,
and might be allowed a nominal police force. Second, the World Bank
would be granted a concession similar to the trust discussed above. The
object of the concession would be to bring industry to the Sinai. The
western sector would remain under Israeli control, but subject to the same
conditions. Final disposition of the Israeli sector would be decided at a set
future date by an international commission created by the U.N. 25
The benefits of this synthesis would be threefold. First, it gives each
country's leaders enough land to combat internal extremists. 26 Second,
Egypt would regain sovereignty over a large part of her land and could,
while remaining consistent with her demands, open the Canal. Third, the
World Bank would be working to integrate the sectors economically. Since
Gaza, the area of the major labor force, would lie in the Israeli's sector,
free intercourse of people and goods would follow. The present relation-
ship between Jordan and the West Bank illustrates the feasibility of this
concept, and a planned interdependence could easily lead to normal trade
relations between Israel and Egypt with the trust area acting as in-
termediary.
C. The West Bank
Since Israel is in control of the West Bank, it is reasonable to suggest
that the most likely use of international law in this area would be by a
unilateral move by Israel. Before discussing the possibilities though, it is
important to explain the advantages to Israel of taking such moves.
First, a relinquishment of the West Bank would relieve Israel of her
most pressing current problem, the nature of the state. The addition of
600,000 Arabs would seriously threaten Israel's Jewish character. Without
resorting to apartheid or expulsion, surrender of this area is necessary to
avoid the possibility of a Moslem majority in a Jewish state.27 Second, the
25This commission would work on the presumption that the land would revert to Egypt,
and the burden of proof would be on the state that argued differently. This would allow any
new Arab state the right to argue for the territory as well as Israel.26There are a large number of Israelis who do not want to give back any large amounts
of land due to security reasons. See TIME, April 12, 1971 for a poll on the Israeli attitude
toward return of the territories. For the Egyptians, they have been warned of the danger of
Israeli expansionism for so long, that perhaps even the elite believe it. There is little doubt the
masses do. Agreeing to a settlement that did not return at least some land to Egypt, could
seriously undermine the strength of the ruling elite.271n 1970 there were 406,000 Israeli Arabs. The non-Jewish birth rate was 44.9 (crude
birth rate per 1,000) versus 21.5 for Jews. The Jewish population at the beginning of 1969 was
2.4 million, and the number of Arabs in all the administered territories was about one million.
This means that there are almost 1.5 million Arabs and 2.5 million Jews within the 1970
cease-fire lines. With a birth rate over double that of the Jews, the Arabs could outnumber
the Jews within 20 years, all things being equal. Facts about Israel, 1970, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem (1970).
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formation of a government that represents the Palestinians means that
Israel could negotiate the questions of compensation and resettlement of
the refugees. The solution to this problem might lead to Israeli integration
into the area as an equal. Third, an Arab Palestine could attract Israeli
Arabs, giving them an outlet for nationalistic energies. Fourth, there need
be little worry about Israel's borders being disproportionately long, 28 since
the old cease-fire lines would not have to be followed.2 9
1. U.N. Plebiscite.
Israel could ask the U.N. to conduct a plebiscite, thereby allowing the
people of the area to decide their own destiny: to become an independent
Palestinian State, reunite with Jordan, create an economic union with
Israel, or some other alternative. Unfortunately, this method is pregnant
with dangers of coercion and political terrorisim. 30 While this plan provides
a legal disposition of the area, it could easily deteriorate into a situation
politically and militarily unacceptable to Israel and should not be consid-
ered a likely alternative.
2. Trust.
A second alternative would work a compromise between the Israeli need
for security and the Arab desire for self-determination. Under Article 73 of
the U.N. Charter, Israel could declare herself trustee of the West Bank in
the name of the Palestinian people until they achieve self-governing sta-
tus.3 ' This would prevent the nascent state from becoming a puppet of
Jordan or acting as a jumping-off ground for future hostilities. By the
addition of the Gaza Strip and the cessation of a route between the two
areas, Israel would add a Mediterranean port to the new state, thereby
ensuring its economic viability and substantially increasing its stability.
28lsrael's pre-1967 borders were: Land 590, Water, 159. After the war there was an
actual decrease in land borders. Land 523, Water 826. The peculiar configuration of the bulge
of Jordan into the center of pre-1967 Israel was responsible for this. Id. at 41.291t is interesting to note that in the Armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab
states, the Arabs insisted that a clause be inserted indicating that the lines drawn up were
NOT to be considered permanent, and were made due to military expediency. See, for
example, 42 U.N.T.S. 303, n. 656, the treaty between Israel and Jordan or 42 U.N.T.S., 251
n. 654, Egyptian Israeli Armistice agreement.
3 During the 1936 - 1939 Arab riots, Arab extremist elements used the tumult to eradi-
cate the more moderate Arab leaders. The end result was that the Arabs killed more Arabs
than Jews. 187 Arabs were killed and 80 Jews. C. SYKES, CROSSROADS TO ISRAEL 161. Note
30(1965).
31U.N. CHARTER article 73 provides, in part:
"Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the adminis-
tration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government
recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount
and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote.., the well-being of the in-
habitants .... "
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3. Return to Jordanian Control.
As pointed out by Professor Blum, there are serious legal questions
regarding the legal reversion of the West Bank.32 Jordan's status was only
that of belligerent occupant, and the legality of returning to her is question-
able. Nevertheless, it appears that the International Community of Nations
would likely support its return to Jordan. 33
As a prerequisite for return to Jordan, Israel would demand a border
readjustment.34 Conditions for return would be greatly enhanced by the
demilitarization of the area under U.N. auspices. A joint
U.N.-Israeli-Jordanian Force could easily patrol the Jordan River to pre-
vent the introduction of arms, and the West Bank could logistically evolve
into a minature Switzerland. Reacquisition of the area would be such an
obvious benefit to Jordan, it is not unreasonable to assume her assent to
these conditions. For Israel, the benefits would be almost the same as
those flowing from a Palestinian state, since provisions for the refugees
would be a condition for return. It should be noted though, that for an
enduring peace to come about in the Middle East, the justifiable cries of the
Palestinians must be answered. 35
D. The Gaza Strip
Gaza has been left out of the above discussions due to a desire for
flexibility in bargaining. The most beneficial disposition of it would be a
link to the new Palestinian state, but if the people did not demand other-
wise, a return to Egypt would not be an unreasonable solution.3 6
III. Politico-Legal Considerations
Concerning Jerusalem and the Golan Heights
A. Jerusalem
In the short passage of time since the 1967 war, there has been a
proliferation of legal articles about Jerusalem.3 7 In view of the adequate
32y. Blum, The Mission Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3
ISRAEL L. REV. 279.3 3See note 47, infra for the Security Council's opinion of the status of Jerusalem and the
legal critique.
a
4See note 28, supra.
35
"The only group in the contemporary Middle East situation with a legitimate grievance
is the Palestinian Arabs. By a complex convergence of circumstances, they have been denied
the opportunity for self-determination and for twenty years have lived in the most degraded
conditions," REISMAN, supra n. 19 at 44.36The people of Gaza would appear before the U.N. Commission and testify as to their
desires for disposition of the land.
37E.g., Eli Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, Monograph for Anglo-Israel
Association (1968); JULIUS STONE, No PEACE-No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Sydney
(1970); S. S. Jones, The Status of Jerusalem: Some National and International Aspects, 33
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treatment elsewhere, extended legal discussion would be redundant. This
exceptional interest in Jerusalem points out its special importance. To the
Jewish people this is especially true. As the holiest place in the Jewish
religion,3 8 Jerusalem's emotional significance cannot be overestimated.
Also, it is a political reality that Jerusalem has become an integral part of
the State of Israel, and the Israelis will not relinquish it.39 Any government
agreeing to a radical change in Jerusalem's status would fall under a vote of
no-confidence, and the succeeding government would, of course, retain
control of it.
In view of the Israeli laws assuring free access to holy places and
freedom of religion, 40 there is no need to change the status of Jerusalem.
The proposed internationalization of 24 years ago 41 was intended to assure
these very rights. Political control of the city by Jordan showed that they
were incapable of fulfilling their obligations, 42 while the Israeli rule has
shown the opposite to be true.43 Since Israel guarantees these rights,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 169 (1968); Roslyn Higgins, The June War: The U.N. and Legal
Background, J. OF CONTEMP. H [ST., July 1968, 252.
38 1t is considered to be a mitzva (a good thing) to be able to live in the Holy City, and in
modern times Jews have always exceeded Moslems in Jerusalem:
In 1844 there were 7,120 Jews to 5,000 Moslems; in 1876, 12,000 Jews to 7,560
Moslems; in 1896, 28,112 Jews to 8,560 Moslems; in 1910 47,000 Jews to 9,800
Moslems; in 1931, 51, 222 Jews to 19,894 Moslems; in 1948, 100,000 Jews to 40,000
Moslems, and in 1967, 200,000 Jews to 54,903 Moslems."
STONE op. Cit., supra note 47, at 19.
As to its importance to other religions, since the end of the crusades, Christian control
has not been an issue, as long as the religious community had autonomy. For Moslems it is
not a major item. In a discussion of the important places in the world to Muslim Jurists, Prof.
Mahmassan discussed Mecca, Medina, the Hedjaz and the remaining Islam lands. Jerusalem
was not even mentioned in this context. S. Mahmassani, The Principles of International Law
in the Light of Islamic Doctrine, R.A.D.I., Tome 117 (Leyde, 1967), at 250- 251. See also
Shlomo Guberman, Christian Religions Courts and the Unification of Jerusalem, 5 ISRAEL L.
REV. 120.
391n a recent TIME poll, although only 29% of Israeli Jews favored annexation of
Western Sinai, and 39% favored annexation of the West Bank, 90% favored annexing
Jerusalem, and only 0.5% would favor returning it. About 8% favored some form of in-
ternationalization. TIME, April 12, 1972, at 31.
40 1n Israel, personal jurisdiction falls under the authority of the religious community, that
is marriage, divorce, etc., is only religious; there is no way to get married by the state. This
insures the freedom to each community to legislate as it desires and follow its own precepts.41U.N. Doc. A/5 16, Partition of Nov. 29, 1947.42Besides desecrating Jewish cemeteries, and destroying synagogues, the Jordanians also
tried to control the Christians in their jurisdiction. In 1958 a law was passed obligating the
priests attached to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to have Jordanian citizenship; these
priests had been of Greek nationality since the 5th Century, A.D. In 1965 a law was passed
with the object of preventing new churches being built, and lands being sold in Jerusalem for
churches to be built in. Jehovah's Witnesses were banned completely, and other Protestant
sects were severely restricted. See Dafna Alon, Arab Racialism, published by The Israel
Economist, Jerusalem, Israel, pp. 77-90, p. 83.
43See Text of Open Letter of 14 December 1970, directed by the Moslem Qadis of Israel
to the Congress for the Propagation of Islam Meeting in Tripoli, Libya. Mimeographed only,
Consulate General of Israel. Part of the Letter:
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international status would add nothing, except perhaps confusion. While
the U.N. seems to take the stand that Jordan has rights to Jerusalem,
Israel's legal claim to it is well based in international law. 44
There is, however, the question of the relationship of the Arab citizens
of Jerusalem to the State of Israel. One solution would be formal annexa-
tion followed by the grant of Israeli citizenship. Another solution would
require the utilization of international law. Executing an agreement be-
tween the Palestinian State and Israel, the Arabs in Jerusalem could
become Palestinian subjects while retaining Jerusalem citizenship. They
would pay municipal taxes and could vote in municipal elections.
For cases involving divorce or marriage, the religious courts would have
jurisdiction, and a special provision would be drafted for tort and criminal
jurisdiction. This provision would specify whether the Jerusalemites would
litigate in a special international court in Jerusalem, be subject to the laws
of their state, or would combine one or the other with an appeal to the
International Court of Justice. Each religious community would retain
control over their own holy places and if desired, the Moslem community
could fly the Palestinian flag over their holy shrines. The overall effect of
this would be to make Jerusalem the de facto capital of both countries,
while conforming to the realities of current Israeli control.
B. The Golan Heights
Syria's increasing belligerency coupled with her refusal to participate in
the Jarring talks, demonstrates her unwillingness to seek a peaceful set-
tlement with Israel. In view of this, and the important strategic value of the
heights45 an annexation of this area would be likely. The Security Council
"We, the Moslems of Israel, maintain our beliefs. No change has taken place in our
religious life. We enjoy full freedom in the observance of our religious obligations, and
our religious courts pass judgment according to Moslem law. Nothing is denied us....
We regret that Moslem governments with whom we are as one in our religious faith
should prevent us from fulfilling the obligation of making a pilgrimage to the house of
Allah .. ." (Signed) "Sheikh Mahmud Tewfik Asalieh, Qadi of Yafo-Jerusalem, Sheikh
Husni el-Zuabi, Qadi of Nazareth, Sheikh Amin Amin Qasim Madlah, Qadi of Acco,
Sheikh Hasan Amin Habash, Qadi of Central Region."44
"The assumption has grown out of that resolution (G.A. Res. 2253, about altering the
status of Jerusalem) ... that Jordan has a legal title in Old Jerusalem which is preferrable to
that of Israel's. Jordan holds Old Jerusalem by virtue of her military action against Israel in
1948 .. " "But there was no discussion at all within the! Security Council of this point; or of
the question whether, if Jordan was in occupation of Old Jerusalem but without title to it, it
could be legally dispossessed by a country claiming to have responded in self-defense to an
attack by Jordan." "... resolutions which by implication take a stand on those questions have
been passed without proper consideration of the legal issues involved." Rosalyn Higgins,
Place of international Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 A.J.I.L.
1, p. 7 (1970). See also Blum, supra note 32; Lauterpacht, supra note 37; and STONE, supra
note 37.
45The Israelis realize this also and in a TIME poll, 86% favored annexation while only 3%
favored return, supra note 42.
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could lawfully approve this annexation without regard to Israel's legal
claim to the area. 46 Even assuming the Council's disapproval, there is
adequate general international law to justify this action.47
Alternatively, a trust territory could be set up for the Druze inhabitants
and in anticipation of nationalistic feelings among the Druze youth in
Israel. This would insure Israel a friendly neighbor to the North.48
IV. Conclusion
An examination of methods and actualities in applying international law
to the Middle East leads to these conclusions about its potential uses.
First, the specialized skills of the International Court of Justice cannot be
utilized in the super-heated political atmosphere surrounding the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Even if the parties were pressured into asking for an
advisory opinion, the court may try to avoid the issue out of a concern for
its credibility. Second, while the U.N. has the political power to impose a
settlement, this course of action would likely be detrimental to a search for
a lasting peace, and it is doubtful that it would use its potential enforcement
abilities.
Third, given the desire for peace by the parties involved, resort to the
special U.N. position as third party enforcer could be quite useful. It is
here that the U.N. can be of greatest help. Utilization of the U.N. as a
Court is not useful nor advisable, but to have it fulfill a function could be of
great help. Fourth, a peaceful solution to an emotional problem like this
one may require unique applications of international law in order to take
into account the political realities of the situation.49
Let us hope international law can rise to this challenge and translate the
concept of "World peace through world law" into reality.
46
"The Security Council is authorized to recommend a settlement which might involve
an infringement upon the rights which the one or the other party has under existing in-
ternational law .... In case of a territorial dispute, for instance, the Security Council might
recommend as appropriate that one part shall cede a part of the disputed territory to the other
party, regardless of whether the latter has any legally justifiable claim to this territory."
KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE U.N. 385.47See for example, KELSEN, id.; Schweber, What Weight to Conquest, 64 A.J.I.L. 344
(1970); Shapira, The Six Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, 6 ISRAEL L. REV. 65; and
STONE, supra, n. 40. While the fact is an arguable one, the point is that it would not be out of
the mainstream of international law for Israel to annex this territory.48The Druze have always been on good relations with Israel, and Israeli Druze are
subject to draft laws at the request of their community. For discussion see the proposal in
REISMAN, supra note 19.49
"Another impediment has been the "political-legal" distinction, the core of which in
international law is simply that what the organized community can do is "legal," what it
cannot do is "political." To assume that enforcement is "political is to beg the question."
Reisman, supra note 9 at 5.
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